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BRIEF OF APPELLEES MAUD AND GILBERT KIMBALL 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF CASE 
Jurisdiction is conferred by Title 78, Chapter 2, Section 2, 
Subsection 5, U.C.A. authorizing review by the Supreme Court of Utah 
of the decisions of the Court of Appeals by Writ of Certiorari. 
This is an appeal by Melvin Fletcher and Peggy Fletcher from a 
decision of the Utah Court of Appeals quieting title to certain 
property in Park City, Utah to Maud and Gilbert Kimball. 
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Priority No. 13 
1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
There is some confusion as to the issues presented since the 
issues which were accepted for review have been rephrased or 
restated in Appellant's Brief to create new issues. Respondents 
object to these issues as not being those accepted for review and 
believe this Court should dismiss this action as being beyond the 
scope of review granted. In response to Appellant's Brief, the issues 
presented are: 
1. The Court of Appeals applied the proper standard of review 
in its decision, which should be affirmed. 
2. Laches is a proper defense to this action where the Fletchers 
and their predecessors unreasonably delayed in bringing the action 
and the Kimballs were prejudiced thereby. 
3. The doctrine of estoppel bars Fletchers' claim in this quiet 
title action. 
4. Permissive use defeats any claim by Fletchers for 
prescriptive rights to the Kimball property. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES OR RULES 
There are no statutes applicable to this determination. 
Rule 52(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is applicable to the 
standard of review applied by the Court of Appeals which states, in 
part: 
"Findings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall 
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be given to the opportunity of the trial court 
to judge the credibility of the witness/' 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This was a quiet title action to ascertain ownership of three 
parcels of contiguous land located near the old Coalition building 
(now destroyed by fire) in Park City, Utah. Just before 
commencement of trial, Sweeney Land Company and Fletchers 
settled their property line dispute with an exchange of deeds and 
Settlement Agreement. Gilbert and Maud Kimball claim title to the 
property based on a 1940 deed from Summit County, as well as the 
fact that the property had been described on the plats in the Summit 
County Recorder's office for many years. After the commencement 
of this action, but prior to trial, it was discovered that Gilbert 
Kimball's deceased brother, Robert's name had been put on the 
original deed. Appellant Fletchers approached Robert's widow, 
Elizabeth and talked her into giving them a Quit-Claim Deed. No 
consideration was given for the Deed, nor did Mrs. Kimball receive 
anything for that exchange. Thereafter, Fletchers asserted a co-
tenant interest in the property as a result of this Deed (T.p. 386, F.F. 
#4). Robert Kimball had categorically disclaimed any interest in the 
property at least 25 years before this claim. 
The trial was held and the Judge entered judgment partitioning 
the property (Addendum 2). Counsel for Fletchers prepared 
Findings, Conclusions and Decree and submitted them to the Court. 
Counsel for Fletchers altered the Judge's ruling and redivided the 
parcel contrary to the decision. In spite of this fact the Judge signed 
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the Decree as prepared by Fletchers' counsel and refused to amend 
the Decree or make any findings as to why he allowed counsel to 
change the property distribution (C.A. Opinion, p. 7; Addendum 3). 
The Utah Court of Appeals, in its Opinion filed October 3, 1988 
(Addendum 1), found that the Fletchers acquired no interest in the 
Kimball property either through the Quit-Claim Deed from Elizabeth 
Kimball or under the Doctrine of Adverse Possession. The Court of 
Appeals also found that Findings of Fact entered by the Trial Court 
were "clearly erroneous" and that the Trial Court made no findings 
concerning the "extensive evidence" demonstrating that Robert 
Kimball not only intended that Gilbert and Maud Kimball own the 
property, but also that he took no action in over 40 years to assert 
any ownership or interest in the property whatsoever. The Court of 
Appeals found that Fletchers were barred by the doctrine of estoppel 
and laches and quieted title to the disputed parcel to Kimballs. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The Court Of Appeals Properly Applied The 
Standard For Appellate Review Of The Facts 
In This Action. 
The Court of Appeals, in its decision, carefully reviewed the 
Findings of Fact in this case. The Court of Appeals applied the proper 
standard of appellate review to their findings and stated on page 2 of 
their Opinion that they applied a "clearly erroneous" standard in 
reversing the Trial Court's Judgment. 
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2 . The Court Of Appeals Properly Ruled That 
Fletchers' Claim Was Barred By The Doctrine 
Of Laches 
During 40 years, Fletchers' predecessor renounced all interest 
in the property and was also silent as to any claim or responsibility 
of ownership. Maud and Gilbert Kimball relied on this and did not 
pursue their claim. Now, after Robert's death, they must defend 
their title. 
3 . Estoppel Also Bars Fletchers' Claim 
The Court of Appeals properly recognized the relationship of 
the parties and found clear evidence and unrefuted testimony that 
Robert Kimball renounced his interest in the property and, after his 
death, his heirs or successors are attempting to repudiate his actions 
to the prejudice of Maud Kimball. 
4. The Court Of Appeals Found That The "Clear 
Weight Of The Evidence" Established That Any 
Use The Fletchers Made Of The Property Was 
Permissive And Therefore Could Not Be 
Prescriptive Or Adverse 
The Kimball and Fletcher families had been close friends for at 
least 40 years. All of the Fletchers, including Mel Fletcher, knew that 
because of that friendship they could use Gilbert's property. Mel 
Fletcher admitted this consensual use at trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent strongly disagrees with the Statement of Facts set 
forth in the Brief of the Appellant as being selective and not 
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reflective of the basis for the Court of Appeals' decision. The record 
amply supports the findings as determined by the Court of Appeals 
as set forth on Pages 3, 4, and 6 of that Opinion (Addendum 1). The 
findings of fact as determined by the Court of Appeals are 
reproduced herein with citations to the record as required by Rule 
24(a)(7), R. Utah S. Ct. 
The Fletchers' claim to Kimballs' property is based solely on a 
Quit-Claim Deed which the Fletchers obtained from Robert Kimball's 
widow, Elizabeth Kimball. There was no consideration nor money 
paid by Fletchers to Elizabeth Kimball for that Deed (T. p. 180). 
Robert and Gilbert Kimball purchased the property in 1940 (T. 
p. 205). Elizabeth testified that Robert and she departed Park City in 
1940 and never again resided in that location (T. p. 206). Although 
Elizabeth stated Robert had not been in Utah during 1947 and 1953, 
she did testify that her late husband did make some visits, in fact, 
they came to Utah as often as "every couple of years" (T. p. 211). 
Maud Kimball testified that taxes on the property for the years 
1942 through 1947 were delinquent but were redeemed by Gilbert 
Kimball. Maud and Gilbert have made the payment for real property 
taxes since that time (T. p. 121). Maud stated that neither Robert nor 
his Estate made any contribution to property taxes (T. p. 120). Maud 
testified that she was present in 1940 or 1941 when Gilbert and 
Robert had a discussion relative to the property. When Gilbert asked 
Robert "if he wanted to pay half of the taxes" Robert said "hell no, I 
want to get out of Park City. I want to move away, and I want 
nothing further to do with this" (T. p. 126). Maud also stated that 
the brothers discussed the property in 1947 (T. p. 127) and that "my 
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husband Gilbert asked if [Robert] wanted to redeem himself and be 
put back for half of the taxes, and he said, no, I"m living in California 
now, and I still want nothing to do with i f (T. p. 128). 
Maud Kimball attempted to clear up some discrepancies as to 
the exact date these conversations occurred, which was over 40 
years ago. She stated that Robert told her and Gilbert to remove his 
name from the deed, but because he was on vacation, Robert would 
not go to the County seat and clarify the matter with a quit-claim 
deed (T. pp. 141-144, 148). While the exact year may be disputed, 
the conversations themselves are unrefuted. 
Gary Kimball, a son of Gilbert and Maud Kimball, testified that, 
in about 1953, he was present during conversations between his 
father and Robert Kimball when Gilbert Kimball informed Robert 
what he had done in order to clear up the title to the property, and 
testified that "[Robert] said it was fine with him. He was out of Park 
City. He was gone for good and had no more interests here" (T. p. 
156). 
Gilbert Kimball's deposition was taken before his death and he 
stated "long before my brother died he said he had nothing to do 
with this property, he refused to pay any part of the taxes on it, so 
he let the property go to taxes. We bought it back in my name in 
1947." Even Mel Fletcher supported the fact that everyone knew 
Gilbert and Maud Kimball owned the property since Mel offered to 
buy the property from Gilbert for $60,000.00, but Gilbert refused the 
offer (T. p. 180). 
Attached to the Notice of Probate Distribution recorded by 
Fletcher's counsel was the Decree of Distribution concerning Robert's 
7 
Estate. That Decree of Distribution referred only to Robert's home in 
Salt Lake City and did not mention this property (Addendum 4). 
On January 18, 1984 in the Third District Court of Salt Lake 
County, in response to a petition to reopen Robert Kimball's Estate to 
determine the ownership of this property, counsel for Elizabeth 
Kimball stated: 
"I would like to simply offer one more time 
that I enter an appearance on behalf of 
Elizabeth Kimball in the District Court in 
Summit County and enter disclaimer of any 
interest coming to her since she is the only 
person, the only litigee, the only devisee is 
entitled to do the entire estate . . . "[emphasis 
added] 
(Ex K-15, T. p. 21) 
The Court of Appeals found, at page 4, 
"However, the (trial) court made no findings 
concerning the extensive evidence showing 
Robert's intent that the Kimballs have the 
property. No evidence was presented in 
rebuttal." 
In addition to the uncontroverted testimony that Robert 
Kimball and his Estate had (1) completely dismissed and abandoned 
any interest in this property; and (2) affirmatively disclaimed and 
surrendered all interest to Kimballs, the record contains 
"overwhelming evidence" indicating Fletchers had permission to use 
parts of the property (C.A. Opinion, p. 6). Gilbert Kimball, in his 
deposition, stated that Mel Fletcher's father had asked him for 
permission to "use the ground" the permission was granted as long as 
Kimballs "had no use for it." Gilbert also claimed that Mel Fletcher's 
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father believed he owed rent, but because of the friendship between 
the families Gilbert refused to accept it. The deposition asserts that 
Gilbert offered to sell Mel Fletcher the property, but the two never 
agreed on a price. Mel Fletcher himself testified he offered Gilbert 
$60,000.00 for the property but was refused (T. p. 180). In addition, 
evidence was submitted in the form of a statement written by 
Juanita Fletcher Love, Roy's daughter and Melvin's sister, which 
reflected that it was her understanding that the property belonged to 
Gilbert and was used with his permission (Addendum 5). Another 
exhibit was received at trial, written by Marion Fletcher, Roy's son 
and Melvin's brother, which again reiterates the permissive use of 
the property (Addendum 6). Maud testified that the Fletcher family 
always had permission to use a portion of the Kimball property (T. 
pp. 130-132). Gary Kimball testified that he was actually present 
when Gilbert discussed the property with Melvin and the later made 
an offer of approximately $90,0000 to $96,000.00 (T. p. 157). Melvin 
also testified in response to whether or not he had permission to use 
this property "in a sense, yes, if they (the Kimballs) owned the 
ground" (T. p. 179). 
Reflective of the Trial Court's confusion and lack of review of 
the evidence is that, at the conclusion of the trial on September 6, 
1985, the Judge entered judgment partitioning the subject property 
into five distinct parcels which were awarded one to Sweeney, one to 
Kimball and three to Fletchers. For some unknown reason, counsel 
for Fletchers prepared findings and judgment which distinctly 
rewrote the distribution of the property and divided two parcels up 
with 50% ownership to Sweeney and 50% to Kimballs. No reason or 
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basis was ever given to this and request by counsel by Kimballs to 
correct this error was denied by the Judge. It is this action which is 
questioned in the Court of Appeals' Opinion, footnote 2 on page 7 
(Addendum 1). 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
The Court of Appeals Applied The 
Proper Standard Of Review 
The Court of Appeals applied the proper standard of review to 
this action. The Court stated at page 2: 
"Utah R. Civil Procedure 52(a) requires that, 
'findings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall 
be given to the opportunity of the trial court 
to judge the credibility of the witness/ We 
are bound to follow the rule together with the 
Utah Supreme Court's guidance, concerning 
the validity of findings of fact, in Acton v. 
Deliran, 131 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987). This 
court will 'accord conclusions of law no 
particular deference, but review them for 
correctness.' Sharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 
1068, 1070 (Utah, 1985). 
This standard was currently reaffirmed by this Court which 
reiterated that the "clearly erroneous standard" applies to cases 
characterized as either ones in equity or in law." Reid v. Mutual of 
Omaha Insurance Company, 110 Ut. Adv. Rpts. 12 (1989). 
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Fletchers' argument, while couched in terms of misapplication 
of the proper standard of review, is actually an attempt to have this 
Court review the sufficiency of the evidence. The only testimony 
marshalled by Fletchers to support this application is found on page 
12 of their Brief. It relates, not to the truth of the assertions that 
Robert Kimball left Park City and told Gilbert and Maud the property 
belonged to them and, thereafter, for the next 40 years, everyone 
believed and acted in conformance with that statement. Instead, 
Appellants point out some discrepancies in the actual year the 
conversation occurred. Elizabeth Kimball, the widow of Robert, 
testified that he was in Utah as often as "every couple of years" (T. p. 
211). Not once does she or any other witness deny the statements 
attributable to Robert Kimball. 
The unrefuted evidence demonstrates that Gilbert Kimball, not 
Robert, paid the taxes on this property in 1946 (Ex. 10, T. p. 119; 
Addendum 7) and ever since (T. p. 121). Contrary to Fletchers' 
assertion on page 12 of their Brief, the tax sale record of Summit 
County shows the sale to Gilbert Kimball in 1947 (Addendum 8). All 
of the assessor's plats show the property as being owned by Gilbert 
and/or Maud Kimball (Addendum 9, 10, 11). Robert Kimball stated 
on at least three occasions that the property was Gilberts and Robert 
didn't want anything to do with it (T. pp. 126-128, 156). There was 
no assertion by his Estate that he had any interest in this property at 
his death (C.A. Opinion, p. 3). In fact, Mel Fletcher offered to buy this 
property from Gilbert Kimball (T. p. 180), but is is submitted that he 
found another way to try and get it for nothing when he found the 
name of Robert Kimball on an old deed and went to Robert's widow 
1 1 
and obtained a Quit-Claim Deed. He did not pay Mrs. Kimball 
anything for the Deed. Also, Mr. Fletcher testified that he had the 
permission of Gilbert and Maud Kimball to use this property (T., p. 
179). 
The findings of the Court of Appeals applied the proper 
standard of review and were reasonable and in conformance with 
the evidence. The Court of Appeals found there was extensive and 
unrefuted evidence that Robert intended Gilbert and Maud Kimball 
to have the property (C.A. Opinion, p. 4). They also found the 
findings were "clearly erroneous" (C.A. Opinion, p. 5) and the 
"overwhelming evidence" demonstrated the use of the property by 
Fletchers was permissive (C.A. Opinion, p. 6). Further, the Court of 
Appeals noted that there was no explanation of why the Trial Court 
allowed counsel for Fletchers to change the property distribution and 
judgment (C.A. Opinion, p. 7, footnote 2) and Judge Orme, concurring 
specially, stated 
"I share Judge Davidson's puzzlement as 
reflected in footnote 2 of the main opinion . . . 
subsequently presented findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, insofar as different from 
such a ruling, are more a product of counsel's 
view of the case and sometimes his or her 
imagination." 
The Trial Court's Opinion is both confusing and contrary to the 
evidence. 
The evidence before the Court of Appeals demonstrates the 
errors made at the Trial Court level and that the decision was 
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contrary to the clear weight of the evidence, Sharf v. BMG Corp. 700 
P.2d 1068 (Utah, 1985). 
Point II 
Laches Is A Proper Defense To This Action 
Where Fletchers And Their Predecessors Have 
Unreasonably Delayed in Bringing The Action 
The Appellate Court found the unrefuted testimony was that it 
was Robert Kimball's intent that Gilbert and Maud Kimball retain 
ownership of this property (C.A., p. 4). "The Kimballs have relied on 
Robert's renouncement of interest in the property and on his 
continued silence and inaction to the time of his death." (C.A., 
Opinion, p. 5). 
Fletchers rely on the case of Beckstrom v. Beckstrom, 578 P.2d 
520 (Utah 1978). That case is inopposite to the facts presently 
before this Court. In Beckstrom,, the brother, Marion, lived on the 
property, did not remember disclaiming any interest in it, made the 
final mortgage payment, and the other co-tenant never made 
statement or took action to "bring home" to his brother that he 
challenged his ownership. 
Contrary to that case, the fact that Gilbert and Maud Kimball 
were the only owners of this property had been brought home to 
Robert Kimball in the most obvious and long-term way and was 
acquiesced to by him. Robert never made any payments on the 
property or for taxes, never lived on the property and never 
disputed that Gilbert and Maud owned it. During the period of about 
25 years, Gilbert and Maud paid all the taxes and conducted 
themselves as if they had sole ownership. If Appellant's position 
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that Robert had an ownership interest is correct, "his failure to claim 
the interest from Kimballs or to commence an action prior to his 
death must be considered unreasonable and prejudicial to the 
Kimballs" (C.A. Opinion, p. 4). 
Further, his claim is barred by the statute of limitations. No 
action was brought within seven years of Robert's death. Parr v. 
Zions First National Bank, 13 U.2d 404, 375, P.2d 461 (1962). 
Point III 
The Court of Appeals Properly Found That 
Fletchers' Claim Was Barred By The 
Doctrine Of Estoppel 
Appellants agree that in order to defeat the claim of a co-
tenant, the claim must be brought home in a clear and unequivocal 
manner, McCready v. Fredericksen, 41 Utah 388, 126 P. 316 (1912); 
Beckstrom v. Beckstrom, 578 P.2d 520 (Utah 1978). 
Without restating all of the facts found by the Court of Appeals, 
its Opinion summarized the evidence which establishes that Kimballs 
have met this standard and that Fletchers have no interest in the 
property (C.A. Opinion, p. 5): 
"The Kimballs have relied on Robert's 
renouncement of interest in the property and 
on his continued silence and inaction to the 
time of his death. Robert's successors in 
interest now repudiate his actions and claim 
that he continued to maintain his status as a 
co-tenant. There is little doubt that such 
repudiation is detrimental to the Kimballs. 
Because Gilbert and Maud believed Robert no 
longer desired an interest in the property, 
they did not pursue the matter further. If 
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they had been given an indication of a change 
in Robert's position prior to his death, they 
could have attempted to obtain a conveyance 
from Robert, obtained an affidavit, or possibly 
brought a quiet title action. Robert's death 
rendered any further negotiations or contact 
with him impossible. Due to their reliance, 
the Kimballs found themselves in Court 
defending title to the property. Even had we 
not found laches to bar this claim, it would be 
barred by estoppel." 
Robert Kimball unequivocally stated he wanted nothing to do 
with the property and the actions of all of the parties involved, 
including Robert Kimball's widow and Estate, confirm that that was 
both his intention and desire. He relinquishment of rights was 
brought home to everyone in the most obvious and continuous way 
possible. 
Point IV 
Permissive Use Defeats Any Claims By Fletchers 
For Prescriptive Rights To The Kimball Property. 
As a secondary means to attempt to gather some rights across 
the Kimballs' property, the Fletchers have alleged they have a 
prescriptive right to use the property. The Appeals Court found, on 
page 6, that the "record contains overwhelming evidence which 
indicates that Fletchers had permission to use portions of this 
property." Without reiterating all of the facts in this case, it is clear 
that the Fletcher and Kimball families were friends and that all use 
of the Kimball property by any of the Fletchers was permissive. 
Because such use was permissive, no adverse or prescriptive rights 
can arise from that use. Hammond v. Johnson, 94 Utah 20, 66 P.2d 
894 (1937). 
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Gilbert Kimball testified that Fletchers had permission to "use 
the ground" (T. pp. 28, 55). Mel Fletcher knew he had permission if 
Kimballs owned it (T. p. 179). Mr. Fletcher tried to buy it, by his own 
admission (T. p. 180). The two families were friends and Fletchers' 
family had permission, always from Maud Kimball (T. pp. 130-132). 
Mr. Fletcher's brother and sister knew the use was permissive 
(Addendum 5 and 6) 
The finding of permissive use is overwhelmingly documented. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals' ruling should be affirmed as entered. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED th is^L day/of AugusW989 
Robert Felton 
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ADDENDUM 
Court of Appeals Opinion 
Trial Court Ruling and Subsequent Judgment 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend Judgment 
Decree of Distribution in the Estate of Robert Kimball 
Statement of Consent by Mel Fletcher's Sister 
Statement re: Consent by Mel Fletcher's Brother 
1942-1946 Tax Receipt to Gilbert Kimball 
1947 Tax Sale Record of Summit County to Gilbert Kimball 
Summit County Ownership Plat for Gilbert Kimball 
Summit County Ownership Plat for Gilbert and Maud Kimball 
Summit County Ownership Plat for Gilbert and Maud Kimball 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
. —--00O00-- -
Sweeney Land Company, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v; 
Gilbert and Mauci K,iiiiJba I I , 
Defendants and Appellants, 
Fletcher, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
51283 
Gilbert and Maud Kimbal1, 
Crossclaim Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
v • 
Melvin 
OPINION 
Not For Publication) 
Case No, 
F I L E 
Counterclaira-crosL 
and Respondents• 
, \ i 
Mc:yT Kcoruri 
Cnfr* ct tfte Cou.l 
r
 Utth Coua of Appeals 
Before J u d g e s Davidson, H . H M I . V " 'met Orme. 
D / W l r i " C.IN i . p i . | . : 
This case involves conflicting claims to several small 
parcels of real property located in Park City, Utah. In 1980, 
the Sweeney Land Company (Sweeney) filed a complaint against 
Gilbert1 and Maud Kimball (Kimballs) in addition to Melvin 
and Peggy Fletcher (Fletchers) seeking to quiet title to 
described land in Sweeney* The Fletchers counterclaimed and 
alleged they had possessed the property "openly, notoriously, 
and adversely for more than seven years and [they] have paid 
the taxes on the same for more than seven years.- The 
Fletchers also claimed their use of the land gave them a 
"prescriptive right or incorporeal hereditaments to said lands, 
1. Gilbert Kimball died during the course of litigation. 
Kimballs were joint tenants in their property interests. 
The 
FYHTI' I I I 
The Kimballs counterclaimed against Sweeney and crossclaimed 
against the Fletchers alleging they were the owners of the 
property as evidenced by a deed and, alternatively, by their 
adverse .-possession. 
The Fletchers subsequently discovered Gilbert Kimball's 
deceased brother, Robert W. Kimball, allegedly held a cotenant 
interest in the property* Melvin Fletcher obtained a quit-claim 
deed from Robert*s widow, Elizabeth, and then moved to amend the 
pleadings to claim a cotenant interest with the Kimballs and to 
request the property be partitioned. On February 22, 1984, the 
Fletchers tendered to the clerk of the court one-half the taxes 
on the property from 1942 to 1983 in view of their cotenant1s 
interest. On August 1, 1984, Sweeney and the Fletchers filed a 
stipulation in which the two parties agreed to exchange 
quit-claim deeds concerning their respective interests in the 
parcels. 
Trial to the court was held on September 5 and 6, 1985. A 
later hearing was held concerning objections to the proposed 
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the judgment and 
decree of quiet title. Subsequently, the Kimballs and Sweeney 
moved for further amendments or for a new trial but were 
denied. We address only those issues#which are dispositive. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) requires that, "Findings of fact, 
whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set 
aside unless clearly erroneous,' and due regard shall be given to 
the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of 
the witnesses." We are bound to follow the rule together with 
the Utah Supreme Court's guidance, concerning the validity of 
findings of fact, in Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 
1987). This court will "accord conclusions of law no particular 
deference, but review them for correctness." Scharf v. BMG 
Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
Fundamental to this opinion is our acceptance of the 1976 
survey as the description of the property conveyed in the 1940 
tax sale by Summit County to the brothers, Gilbert and Robert 
Kimball. The survey was executed by a licensed land surveyor 
who utilized the most accurate information then obtainable, 
whereas the 1940 tax deed is described in general terms. 
ROBERT W. KIMBALL INTEREST 
The Fletchers0 claim is primarily based on the quit-claim 
deed obtained from Robert W. Kimball's widow, Elizabeth. For 
the quit-claim deed to have any validity, Robert must have been 
a cotenant with Gilbert until his death and Elizabeth must have 
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been Robert's successor m interest. There is no doubt that the 
brothers purchased the property in 1940. Elizabeth testified 
that Robert and she departed Park City in 1940 and never again 
resided in that location. Although Elizabeth stated Robert had 
not been in Utah during 1947 and 1953, she did testify that her 
late husband did make some visits. 
Maud Kimball testified that taxes on the ^ijpeiLj *.^
 w;ie 
years 1942 through 1947 were delinquent but were redeemed by 
Gilbert Kimball who then made payment on the taxes until his 
death in 1983. She stated that neither Robert nor his estate 
made any contribution for property taxes. Maud further 
testified that she was present in 1940 or 1941 when Gilbert and 
Robert had a discussion relative to the property at issue. When 
Gilbert asked Robert "if he wanted to pay half of the tax," 
Robert is reported as saying, "Hell no, I want to get out of 
Park City, 1 want to move away, and I want nothing further to 
do with this." Maud also stated that the brothers discussed the 
property in 1947. Maud testified, "My husband Gilbert asked if 
[Robert] wanted to redeem himself and be put back for half of 
the taxes, and he said, no, I'm living in California now, and I 
still want nothing to do with it." When questioned about 
answers given in her deposition taken prior to trial, Maud 
attempted to clear up what appeared tq be discrepancies 
concerning whether she heard the conversations between Gilbert 
and Robert. She also stated that Robert told the Kimballs to 
remove his name from the deed, but because he was on vacation, 
Robert would not go to the county seat and clarify the matter 
with a quit-claim deed. 
Gary Kimball, a son of Gilbert and Maud Kimball, testified 
that, in about 1953, he was present when his father and his 
Uncle Robert discussed property in Park City. A portion of the 
conversation concerned the property at issue. When his father 
told Robert what he had done relative to redeeming the property, 
Gary stated, "[Robert] said it was fine with him. He was out of 
Park City. He was gone* for qood and had no more interests here 
Gilbert Kimball's deposition was taken a few months prior to 
his death. In it he stated, "Long before my brother died he 
said he had nothing to do with this property. He refused to pay 
any part of the taxes on it, so we let the property go to 
taxes. And we bought it back in my name [in 1947]." 
Attached to the notice of probate distribution recorded by 
the Fletchers' counsel was the decree of distribution concerning 
Robert's estate. Although the residuary clause refers to "any 
and all other property which may belong to said Estate, whether 
herein particularly mentioned or not," the section dealing with 
real property only refers to Robert's home in Salt Lake City. 
880080-CA 3 
The court found no evidence that the Kiraballs ever gave 
notice to Robert of their intent to adversely possess the 
property. The court further found that Robert had never 
officially conveyed his interest to the Kimballs. However, the 
court made no findings concerning the extensive evidence showing 
Robert's intent that the Kimballs have the property. No 
evidence was presents* -n rebuttal. 
The Kimballs assert that the claims of both the Fletchers 
and Sweeney are barred by the doctrines of laches and estoppel. 
a. L9ChQs 
This doctrine was recently discussed in Borland Bv Deot. pf[ 
Social Serv. v. Chandler. 733 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1987), where 
the court stated, "To successfully assert a laches defense, a 
defendant must establish both that the plaintiff unreasonably, 
delayed in bringing an action and that the defendant was 
prejudiced by that delay." In Papanikolas Bros. Enter, v. 
Suoarhouse Shopping Center Assoc. 535 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1975), 
the court wrote: 
Although lapse of time is an essential 
part of laches, the length of time must 
depend on the circumstanced of each case, 
for the propriety of refusing a claim is 
equally predicated upon the gravity of the 
prejudice suffered by defendant and the 
length of plaintiff's delay. 
Id. at 1260 (footnote omitted). 
If we assume Gilbert's redemption of the property in his 
name in 1947 and notification of such redemption to Robert no 
later than the mid-1950*s as giving rise to a cause of action 
by Robert or his successors in interest, approximately 25 years 
passed before any complaint was filed. During this period, the 
Kimballs paid all the property taxes and conducted themselves 
as if they had sole ownership. If Robert believed he still 
possessed a cotenant interest, his failure to claim the 
interest from the Kimballs or to commence an action prior to 
his death must be considered unreasonable and prejudicial to 
the Kimballs. This claim is barred by laches. 
b. EstQPPgl 
Leaver v. Grose, 610 P.2d 1262, 1264 (Utah 1980), reports, 
"The doctrine of estoppel has application when one, by his 
acts, representations, or conduct, or by his silence when he 
ought to speak, induces another to believe certain facts exist 
and such other relies thereon to his detriment (footnote 
omitted).- Additionally, "The elements of equitable estoppel 
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are: 'conduct by one parity which leads another party, in reliance 
thereon, to adopt a course of action resulting in detriment or 
damage if the first party is permitted to repudiate his 
conduct.'" Blackhurst v. Transamerica Ins. Co.. 699 P.2d 688, 
691 (Utah 1985)(quoting United American Life Ins. Co, vf 7Ann* 
First Nat'l Bank. ^4] p#2d 158, 161 (Utah 1985)). 
The Kimballs have relied on Robertfs renouncement of interest 
. the property and on his continued silence and inaction to the 
time of his death. Robert's successors in interest now repudiate 
his actions and claim that he continued to maintain his status as 
a cotenant. There is little doubt that such repudiation is 
detrimental to the Kimballs, Because Gilbert and Maud believed 
Robert no longer desired an interest in the property, they did 
not pursue the matter further. If they had been given an 
indication of a change in Robert's position prior to his death, 
they could have attempted to obtain a conveyance from Robert, * 
obtained an affidavit, or possibly brought a quiet title action. 
Robert's death rendered any further negotiations or contact with 
him impossible. Due to their reliance, the Kimballs found 
themselves in court defending title to the property. Even had we 
not found laches to bar this claim, it would be barred by 
estoppel. The Fletchers cannot claim any interest in the 
property because of the quit-claim deed from Robert*s widow# 
Elizabeth. 
ADVERSE POSSESSION 
The court found that the Fletchers1 use of a portion of the 
property was adverse to the Kimballs. Specifically, the trial 
court found the Fletchers* use -was not under any agreement or 
permission from any person or entity." We disagree. To hold a 
finding of fact to be clearly erroneous requires "that if the 
findings . , , are against the clear weight of the evidence, or 
if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made, the findings . . . wi 
be set aside.- State v. Wright. 744 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah App. 
1987)(quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)). 
In Olwell v. Clark, 658 P-. i '•• '• •' ^i ' ^  the couit wrote: 
[I]n order to show successful adverse 
possession, the claimant must intend to 
acquire title, must by declaration or 
conduct give actual or constructive notice 
to the legal title holder, and must possess 
the property in a manner variously called 
"open," "notorious," or -hostile" for a 
peH** n^ seven years. . • . It is 
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generally agreed that, in order for the 
claimants conduct to give notice, it must 
be conduct that is inconsistent with the 
rights of the owner. 
Id. at 587 (citation omitted). 
Adverse possession cannot arise from use by the claimant 
with the permission of the legal title holder. Hammond v. 
Johnson, 94 Utah 20, 66 P.2d 894 (1937). The record contains 
overwhelming evidence which indicates the Fletchers had 
permission to use portions of the property. Gilbert, in his 
deposition, states that Melvin Fletcher's father, Roy, had 
asked him for permission "to use the ground." The permission 
was granted as long as the Kimballs "had no use for it." 
Gilbert further claimed that Roy believed he owed Gilbert rent 
which the latter refused to accept. The deposition asserts 
that Gilbert offered to sell Melvin the property, but the two 
never agreed on a price. Gilbert's deposition refers to an 
exhibit which is a statement written by Juanita Fletcher Love, 
Roy's daughter and Melvin's sister. The statement reflects 
Juanita's understanding that a portion of the property in 
dispute belonged to Gilbert and was used with his permission. 
Additional mention is made of another exhibit which was also 
received by the trial court, a statement by Marion Fletcher, 
Roy's son and Melvin's brother. This statement indicates that 
Roy's use of the Kimball property was subject to Gilbert's 
revocable permission. Maud testified that the Fletcher family 
always had permission to use a portion of the Kimball 
property. Gary Kimball testified he was present when his 
.father, Gilbert, discussed the property with Melvin and the 
latter made an offer of approximately $90,000 - $96,000 for 
it. Also, Melvin Fletcher testified, when asked if his family 
had the permission of the Kimball family to go across the 
property, "In a sense, yes, if they [the Kimballs] owned the 
ground." Melvin's testimony reveals he offered Gilbert $60,00C 
for the property, but had been refused. This evidence shows 
that Melvin's use of the Kimball property was with consent. 
We, therefore, hold that the finding of adverse possession, or 
conduct inconsistent with the rights of the Kimballs, is 
against the clear weight of the evidence. 
The Fletchers have acquired no interest in the Kimball 
Property at issue either through the quit-claim deed from 
Elizabeth or under the doctrine of adverse possession. The 
c
*se is remanded to the trial court for entry of judgment 
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consistent with this opinion.2 I117 Sweeney claims that are 
based on deeds received from the Fletchers and concern the 
Kimball property, must fail. Title to that property is quieted 
in the Kimballs. There appears to be no reason why the deeds 
between Sweeney and the Fletchers, not affecting the Kimball 
property, should not stand, although the trial court should 
examine this on remand. Each party will bear their* own costy 
on appeal* 
This opinion is not regarded as adding anything signil £ 
w^ existing law. Additionally, the fact situation is so 
complex that the case might prove confusing to any reader. For 
these reasons this opinion is not to be published in the Utah 
orJ^axzlSip Reporters. 
„ . A 
* // 
Richard C. David^n, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge' 
ORME, Judge: (concurring speci.n " I 
I agree t««w this difficult case should be remanded, 
although I am not prepared to go as far as my colleagues 
defining what the outcome on remand should be. 
2. We find it difficult to follow from the record why the trial 
court signed the judgment and decree of quiet title which does 
not comport with its oral ruling. We realize the trial court 
heard objections to the findings of fact, conclusions of law, 
and the judgment and decree, but there is nothing before us to 
indicate why the changes from the oral ruling were made. 
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As concerns the issue of Robert Kimball's widow's curious 
conveyance to Melvin Fletcher/ I also see error in the trial 
court's not making findings "concerning the extensive evidence 
showing Robert's intent that the Kiraballs have the property." 
While the majority's analysis of the two doctrines is sound, I 
am not# however, persuaded that the evidence shows as a matter 
of law that the Fletchers' claim is barred by laches and/or 
estoppel. As to this part of the dispute, I would simply 
remand with instructions that the trial court make findings 
relative to Robert's comments and conduct and draw any 
appropriate legal conclusions concerning laches and estoppel 
from those findings. 
I concur in Judge Davidson's opinion insofar as it concerns 
the adverse possession issue and the treatment to be accorded on 
remand to the deeds between Sweeney and the Fletchers. 
I share Judge Davidson's puzzlement as reflected in 
footnote 2 of the main opinion. While it is true that "[a]ny 
judge is free to change his or her mind on the outcome of a case 
until a decision is formally rendered," Bennion v. Hansen, 699 
P.2d 757, 760 (Utah 1985), the court's ruling from the bench, 
fresh on the heels of trial, is a product of the court's own 
mental impressions and contemporaneous, neutral assessment of 
the evidence. Subsequently presented* findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, insofar as different from such a ruling, are 
more a product of counsel's view of the case—and sometimes of 
his or her imagination. While a court has every right to alter 
its perception of a case, it should take pains to explain fully 
any differences between its "untainted" ruling from the bench 
and its formal decree. 
Finally, I would order counsel not to disclose this case to 
the Bar Examiner Committee of the Utah State Bar. They would be 
unable to resist fashioning the next Bar exam's real property 
question after the facts of this case—and such would clearly 
violate the Bar applicants' rights under the eighth amendment to 
the United States Constitution. 
Gregory^. Orme, Judge 
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1 CLAIM TO THE HERCIHISER PARCEL IS SUPERIOR TO THAT OF THE 
2 PLAINTIFF. TITLE TO THAT PARCEL IS QUIETED IN THE PLAINTIFF 
3 AS TO THE PRINCIPAL KIMBALL PARCEL, IT IS THE LAW 
4 IN UTAH THAT CO-TENANTS IN REALITY STAND IN A UNIQUE RE-
5 LATIONSHIP QF CONFIDENCE AND TRUST BY REASON OF THEIR 
6 I COMMUNITY OF INTERESTS. THIS RELATIONSHIP MAKES IT PARTICU-
7 LARLY DIFFICULT FOR A PARTY TO CLAIM ADVERSE POSSESSION 
8 AGAINST HIS CO-TENANT. THE CO-TENANT'S INTEREST MUST BE 
g I DISAVOWED BY THE ACTS OF THE MOST OPEN AND NOTORIOUS 
10 CHARACTER^ WHICH SHOW CLEARLY TO THE WORLD THE CLAIMANT'S 
n INTENTION TO EXCLUDE THE RIGHTS OF THE CO-TENANTS. THERE 
12 IS A HIGHER STRICTER STANDARD OF NOTICE TO HIS CO-TENANT 
13 COMMENSURATE WITH HIS POSITION OF TRUST. PAYMENT OF 
14 TAXES BY ONE CO-TENANT INURES TO THE BENEFIT OF ALL, OR 
15 BOTH IN THIS CASE, CO-TENANTS, CREATING A RIGHT OF REIMBURSE 
16 MENT ONLY. MCCREADY V. FREDERICKSEN, 41 UTAH 388, AND 
17 SEVERAL CASES SINCE AND UP TO AND INCLUDING THE CASE OF 
18 OLWELL V. CLARK, 658 P.2D 585, 1982. THE EVIDENCE, IN MY 
JUDGMENT, HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT THE CO-TENANCY 
BETWEEN ROBERT AND GILBERT KIMBALL WAS TERMINATED. 
21 I ACCORDINGLY, DEFENDANTS FLETCHER CLAIMING THROUGH ELIZABETH 
22 KIMBALL DEED, EXHIBIT 17, ARE DECLARED TO BE CO-TENANTS WITH 
MAUD KIMBALL IN THE PRINCIPAL KIMBALL PARCEL. 
I 
IT IS FURTHER DETERMINED THAT SAID PARCEL SHOULD 24 
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GERALD H. KINGHORN 
KAPALOSKI, KINGHORN & PETERS 
Attorney for Melvin and Peggy Fletcher 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-8644 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR 
NO 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH p- J J 'p 
SWEENEY LAND COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GILBERT and MAUD KIMEALL 
et al., 
Defendants. 
GILBERT and MAUD KIMBALL, 
Crossclaim Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MELVIN FLETCHER and PEGGY 
FLETCHER, et al., 
Counter-Crossclaimants. 
Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on 
file herein and good causing appearing therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Title is quieted in Sweeney Land Company as to the follow-
ing: 
Parcel 1: Beginning at a point North 28o50l West 79.5 feet 
from the Southwest corner cf Block 53, Snyderfs Addition to 
Park City and running, thence North 61°14'19" East 99.03 
feet, thence South 28°50' East 15.00 feet, thence South 
61014f19" West 99.03 feet to the Easterly side line of Park 
Avenue, thence North 28°50f West 15.00 feet, more or less, 
to the point of beginning. 
BY <=£fc 
Deput C'sric ' • • • V 
JUDGMENT AND 
DECREE OF 
QUIET TITLE 
Civil No. 6211 
Parcel *.: A 50% undivided interest in the parcel described 
as follows: Beginning at a point which is North 28°45M1" 
West, 64.5 feet and North 61°14l19n East 99,03 feet from the 
S.W. corner of Block 53, Snyders Addition to Park City, 
thence North 28°45f41" West 15.00 feet, thence North 61°10l 
East 33.90 feet; North 23°50f West 30.00 feet, thence North 
64°11T East 17.00 feet, thence South 43°13f East 44.50 feet, 
rrcre c: "*-</, t- r *v Northeast corner of the parcel decreed 
*c Melvin Fletcher and Peggy Fletcher herein, thence South 
*:°14f19" West 62.00 feet, "more or less, along the North 
line c tr... Ic:,d decreed to Melvin Fletcher and Peggy 
yiotcht : h< r.-i'; - t'-.- uoi rit of beginning 
*• N> dieted ; f ::< Defendant Maud Kl mball as her sole 
f o 11 o w i n g p a r c e 1 o f 1 a n d , 
Parcel 1: Beginning at a point North 23° 3b f West 65.97 
feet and North 33° 25f West 46.7 feet from the Southeast 
corner of Block 7, amended plat of Park City, "LJ- in 
Section 16, Township 2 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian, thence South 61° 10' West 73.16 feet, thence 
North 28° 50f West 55.7 feet, thence North 61° 10' East, 70 
feet more or less, thence South 33° 25' East, 58 feet more 
or less to the pc I nt of beginning 
Parcel 2: A 50% undivided interest in the parcel described 
as follows: Beginning at a point which is North 28°45f41" 
West, 64.5 feet and North 61°14f19n East 99.03 feet from the 
S.W. corner of Block 53, Snyders Addition to Park City, 
thence North 28°45,41f' West 15.00 feet, thence North 61°10f 
East 33.90 feet; North 28°50' West 30.00 feet, thence North 
64°11' East 17.00 feet, thence South 43°13' East 44.50 feet, 
more or less, to the Northeast corner of the parcel decreed 
to Melvin Fletcher and Peggy Fletcher herein, thence South 
61°14f19" West 62.00 feet, more or less, along the North 
line of the land decreed to Melvin Fletcher and Peggy 
Fletcher herein to the point of beginning. 
3. Title i:-. hereby quieted ami [k I i i h-N \wi .mil rv-q^ y 
Fletcher .. *heir sole and separate property in and to the 
Beginning at a point North 23°38f West 85.97 feet and 
North 33°25' West 46.70 feet from the Southeast corner of 
Block 7, Amended plat of Park City in Section 16 Township 2 
South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and South 
61o10l West, 73.16 feet and North 28°50f West 55.7 feet to 
the true point of beginning; 
Thence along the following courses and distances: 
] . h 2 8°50' West along the East boundary of the land 
33o 
conveyed to Melvin Fletcher by Mary Workman a distance of 
60.6 feet, thence North 61°10f East 61.93 feet, thence South 
43° 13' East 15 feet, thence South 33°25f East 47.6 feet 
more or less, thence South 61°10' West 70 feet more or less 
to the true point of beginning. 
Each party is to bear their own costs and attorneys fees. 
DATED this _J^Tday of JlJSb^ 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
HT SAGE300 "3" jv 
Robert Felton, 1056 
5 Triad Center 
Suite 585 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
Phone; (801) 359-9216 
Attorney for Defendants 
and Crossclaim Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * 
SWEENEY LAND COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
GILBERT ana MAUD KIMBALL, et al 
Defendants. 
GILBERT and MAUD KIMBALL, 
Crossclaim Plaintiffs, 
vs . 
MELVIN FLETCHER and PEGGY 
FLETCHER, et al., 
Counterclaim-Crossclaimants. 
* * * * * * * * * 
Robert Felton, attorney for Kimballs, hereby submits this 
Memorandum in support of his Motion for a New Trial filed in the 
above-entitled action. 
JUDGMENT AND FINDINGS SIGNED BY THE COURT 
FAIL TO REPRESENT THE COURT'S RULING 
Kimballs, by and through their attorney, hereby move this 
Court that a new trial be granted for and on the ground that the 
Findings and Judgment are in such disarray and contrary to the 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR 
TO AMEND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 6211 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
ruling ot this Court that substantial justice demands a new 
trial. The Judgment and Findings which were" submitted by counsel 
for Fletchers do not reflect the ruling of this Court and it is 
submitted that counsel's alteration of the ruling is f in and of 
itself, persuasive evidence of the error in this Court's ruling. 
On Page 3 of this Memorandum are two diagrams which roughly 
delineate the property addressed after the trial in this 
action. The top diagram describes the distribution of the 
property in accordance with the Recorder's transcript of the 
Court's ruling dated September 6, 1985. 
The lower diagram describes the property distribution as 
reflected by the Judgment and Findings executed by the Court. 
As can be clearly seen, the distribution of Parcels MAM and 
"BM on the' attached diagram differ significantly from the 
conclusion at trial and that reflected in the written Judgment. 
In audition to the differences between the Ruling and the 
written Judgment, either distribution of the property is so 
fatally flawed as to require a new trial. At the commencement of 
the trial both counsel for Sweeny and counsel for Fletchers 
stated that they made no claim to Parcel "A", the Hersheiser 
Parcel, and counsel for Kimballs moved for an Order quieting 
title in that parcel to them. The Court denied the Motion with 
leave to reconsider it after hearing the evidence (Findings of 
Fact Pg. 2) . 
In the Judgment of the Court the parcel of property to which 
neither Sweeney nor Fletcher claimed any interest was awarded in 
one case 100% to Sweeneys and in the other case (written 
[A 
r
"
T1 
8|c| 
1 
! 
1 
1 1 
D 
• ^ 
£ 
A - Hersheiser Parcel 
& C - 30f Strip 
& E - Kimball Parcel 
RULING FROM THE BENCH 
A - Sweeney 100% 
B - Fletcher 100% 
C - Fletcher 100% 
D - Fletcher 100% 
E - Kimball 100% 
WRITTEN JUDGMENT 
A - Sweeney 50%; Kimball 50% 
B - Sweeney 50%; Kimball 50% 
C - Fletcher 100% 
D - Fletcher 100% 
E - Kimball 100% 
Judgment) divided 50% to Sweeney and 50% to Kimball* Not only 
was there no evidence submitted by Sweeney as to ownership of 
this parcel of property, they expressly never claimed an interest 
in it yet the ruling awards it to them anyway. 
The written judgment awards the northern half of the 30 foot 
strip designated on the diagram as Parcel MB" 50% to Sweeneys and 
50% to Kimballs, yet Kimballs 1 claim to the entire 30 foot strip 
(Parcels "C" and "B") is exactly the same. There is no evidence 
nor justification to somehow delineate Parcels "B" and MC" and it 
is submitted that if Kimball maintain a 50% interest in Parcel 
MB M then they should also have a 50% interest in Parcel MC*\ 
THE COURT APPLIED THE WRONG BURDEN OF PROOF AND LAW 
AND SAID APPLICATION WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS 
The ruling of the Court from the bench set forth that 
Fletchers, by a preponderance of the evidence, used the 30 foot 
strip adversely against Kimballs. In the next paragraph, at 
least as to the main parcel of property, the Court states that 
the Kimballs have failed to satisfy their burden of proof against. 
a co-tenant as set forth in Olwell v. Clark 658 P.2d 585 
(1982). The claim which Fletchers assert to Parcels "BM and "C" 
(the 30 foot strip) arises directly out of their claim of co-
tenancy with Kimballs. That co-tenancy cannot be terminated 
unless it meets the higher standards set forth in Olwell supra* 
The Notice of Probate Distribution filed by Mr. Kinghorn 
described the entire parcel of property (Parcels "A"
 f "B", "C H, 
MD" and "E") demonstrating a clear position that Fletchers' 
interest was claimed to be as a co-tenant and the ruling applies 
the Strieker standard against Kimball while ignoring the 
relationship in distributing the other parcels. The Findings of 
Fact (Paragraph 8) also asserts that the entire parcel is the 
property deeded to Kimballs in 1940. 
These facts considered in conjunction with those cited 
earlier demonstrate that the ruling is so .confused and the law 
has been applied so randomly that a new trial is the only logical 
way to straighten out the ownership of this property and place it 
in the proper hands. 
THE COURT MISAPPREHENDED THE LAW REGARDING 
ADVERSE POSSESSION AND PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT 
In its ruling from the bench, this Court stated that the 
only difference between adverse possession and a prescriptive 
easement was the length of time each took to vest (excluding 
payment of taxes). This misapprehension of the law of this State 
is a major error in the ruling. The Court's ruling stated that 
Fletchers received title to the 30 foot strip (even though that 
is changed in the written judgment). There is no dispute that 
Fletchers paid no taxes on the property and, therefore, cannot 
acquire title by adverse possession as set forth in § 78-12-12 
U.C.A. (1953) . 
Since there can be no adverse possession in Fletchers, the 
only right which can be acquired is one by prescription. The 
Court's ruling quieted title in the 30 foot strip to the 
Fletchers, it did not grant them an easement across it. The 
Court has, very simply, confused the acquisition of title 
pursuant to the adverse possession statute with the right of use 
as against the fee title holder acquired by continuous years of 
use. The Court has granted fee title in Fletchers which is 
impossible under the Doctrine of Prescription. 
It is further submitted that the only evidence as to use of 
the 30 toot parcel by Fletchers which can conceivably be 
construed to meet the requirements of prescriptive easement 
(excluding the issue of co-tenancy) was for a driveway accessing 
the rear of his house. The evidence and plat submitted into 
evidence clearly delineates the alleged driveway as being eight 
feet wide. The easement, if any, cannot be expanded by Order of 
this Court and must be confined to its historical existence. 
Kimballs submit that the finding of an easement is not 
supported by the evidence but, if the Court sustains itself, that 
the easement can only be eight feet wide and used for a driveway 
because that is the size and use established historically. 
McBride v. McBride 581 P.2d 996 (Utah 1978). 
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE COURT'S VERDICT 
Counsel for Kimballs admits some confusion in the 
application of the facts and the conclusions drawn by the 
Court. At the hearing before this Court on November 4, 1985, it 
was stated that the Court would execute the written documents 
submitted by counsel for Fletchers. This was done in spite of 
the fact% t^at the written Judgment significantly alters the 
ruling of the Court and is not in conformance therewith. The 
evidence as a whole does not support the Court's ruling either 
from the bench or the written form. A different standard of 
proof was applied in the termination of the co-tenancy between 
Kimball and Fletcher as to Kimballs 1 interest but was not applied 
to Fletchers 1 interest. Fee title was granted to a 30 foot strip 
when only an easement was proven and the distribution of the 
property is not supported by the evidence. 
The Court's'ruling fails to address the easement claimed by 
Kimballs over the 30 foot strip. If Fletchers have an easement 
to the 30 foot strip north of the Kimball parcel then the issue 
of the prescriptive use of the remaining parcel up to Park Avenue 
must be addressed. This is especially true in light of the 
findings and allegation that Fletchers and Kimballs are co-
tenants. If they are co-tenants then Kimballs should also have 
such an easement. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no doubt that this is a complicated case involving 
a lot ot different descriptions and uses of property over a great 
number of years. The resolution of the dispute, however, has 
been further complicated by three significant factors: 
1. The written Judgment and Findings significantly changes 
the property distribution that the Court made at the time of 
trial, 
2. The burden of proof and standard of care as between co-
tenant has been misapplied, and 
3, The Court has misapprehended the applicable law as 
quiet title actions and adverse use. 
It is submitted to this Court that there is one apparer 
fact that stands out at the conclusion of these proceedings 
That fact is that everyone, including the Court, appear 
confused. 
It is respectfully submitted that the only way to unwir 
this web of confUsion and at the same time do substantial justic 
to all parties is to grant a new trial where the parties ca 
present their proof and clarify the confusion which has arise 
from these initial proceedings. 
This is a very valuable piece of property located next to 
ski lift in Park City and the parties deserve a resolution whic 
is, to the best of everyone's ability, fair and in accordanc 
with the applicable law. It is submitted that the situation a 
it exists now does not rise to that standard. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / ^ 7 day of Novepfce^, 1985. 
HAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of th 
foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR T 
AMEND JUDGMENT postage prepaid, to Paul Veasey, 50 West Broadway 
4th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, Gerald Kinghorn, 1 
Exchange . Place, Suite 1000, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 o 
this
 j/A5~^ day of September, 1985. 
GERALD H. KINGHORN 
KAPALOSKI, KINGHORN & PETERS 
Attorney for Melvin and Peggy Fletcher 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-8644 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SWEENEY LAND COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GILBERT and MAUD KIMBALL 
et al., 
Defendants, 
GILBERT and MAUD KIMBALL, 
Crossclaim Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MELVIN FLETCHER and PEGGY 
FLETCHER, et al., 
Counter-Crossclaimants. 
The motion of the Defendant Kimball and the Plaintiff for a 
new trial or in the alternative to alter or amend the judgment 
came on regularly for hearing on December 2, 1985 at 10:00 a.m. 
before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Judge at the District 
Courtroom, Summit County Courthouse, Coalville, Utah. Counsel 
for the Defendant Kimball, Robert Felton, Counsel for the Plain-
tiff Sweeney Land Company, Paul Veasy and Counsel for Melvin and 
Peggy Fletcher, Gerald H. Kinghorn were present. 
EXHIBIT "R" 
ORDER DENYING 
MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL 
AND TO ALTER OR AMEND 
THE JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 6211 
The Court heard the arguments for and in opposition to the 
motions, and upon being fully advised it is hereby ordered that 
each motion be and the same hereby are denied. 
DATED this day of January, 1986. 
BY THE COURT 
J. Dennis Frederick 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR NFW TRIAL AND TO ALTER OR 
AMEND THE JUDGMENT was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following 
on this -2. day of January, 1986. 
Robert Felton 
5 Triad Center, Suite 585 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
Paul Veasy 
50 West Broadway 
4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Robert H , Rugger i , Esq. 
Attorney for Executr ix 
Off ice and Post Office Address: 
59 East Center S t ree t 
Box 310, M o a b , "Utah 84532 
801-259-5611 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lako County Utah 
FCB111976 
£>«puiy Clerk 
IN T H E T H I R D JUDIC IAL D I S T R I C T C O U R T , 
IN AND FOR S A L T L A K E C O U N T Y , S T A T E O F U T A H 
In the Mat te r of the Estate of 
R O B E R T W . K I M B A L L , 
a lso known as 
R O B E R T K I M B A L L , 
a lso known as 
R O B T . W . K I M B A L L , and 
being one and the same person, 
Deceased. 
P R O B A T E N O . 62327 
D E C R E E O F D I S T R I B U T I O N 
E L I Z A B E T H W . K I M B A L L , Executr ix of the Estate of Robert W . K i m b a l l , 
a lso known as Robert K i m b a l l , also known as Robt. W . K i m b a l l , and being one and 
the same person, and hereinafter for convenience referred to as Robert W . K i m b a l l , 
deceased, having on the J& day o f S S ^ m y ? A . D . , 1976, f i led in this Court her 
Pet i t ion , setting fo r th , among other things, that a l l accounts in said Estate have 
been paid and f inal ly settled; that said Estate is now in a condition to be closed; that 
a portion of said Estate remains to be distributed and Peti t ioner prays therein that 
the residue and the whole of said Estate be distributed to El izabeth W . K i m b a l l , 
the person entitled to receive the entire and whole of said Estate , and said mat ter 
coming on regular ly to be heard this / / day oC^afejary, A . D . , 1976, this 
Cour t proceeds to the hearing of said Pet i t ion. 
It appearing to the satisfaction of this Court that the C le rk duly fixed the 
t i m e and place for the hearing of said Petit ion and gave due notice thereof as r e -
quired by law; that a l l Accounts have been ful ly sett led; tK<t a l l taxes against the 
property of said Estate have been paid; that there is no inheritance tax due and 
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owmg rrom the said Estate to the State of Utah, nor to the United States of 
A m e r i c a ; that the residue of said Estate , and the whole thereof, consisting of 
the real and personal property hereinafter par t icu lar ly described and re fer red 
t o , Is now ready for distr ibution. 
And I t further appearing to the Court that Robert W . K i m b a l l , deceased, 
died testate on the 20th day of M a r c h , A . D . , 1975 at Sal t Lake C i t y , Sal t Lake 
County, State of Utah; that said deceased at the t ime of his death was a resident 
of Sal t Lake C i t y , Utah; that said deceased left surviving him as his sole legatee 
and devisee under his Last W i l l and Testament, his w i f e , El izabeth W . K i m b a l l , 
now residing at 2283 Garf ie ld Avenue, Salt Lake C i t y , Utah 84108. 
And it further appearing to the Court that the said El izabeth W . Kimbal l 
Is now the owner of the whole of said estate and Is ent i t led, therefore , to have 
the entire residue and the whole of said estate distributed to h e r . 
Now, on this // day dZgfcfluary, A . D . , 1976, on motion of Robert H . 
Rugger l , Attorney for said Executr ix , and no objection being made thereto, and 
there being no objection on f i l e , 
IT IS H E R E B Y C R D E R E D , ADJUDGED A N D D E C R E E D : 
That the residue and the whole of the Estate of Robert W , K i m b a l l , 
deceased, hereinafter part icular ly described and set forth and now remaining 
In the hands of said Executr ix , together with any cind a l l othe rpr ope r ty which may 
belong to said Estate , whether herein part icular ly mentioned or not, or In which 
said Estate may have any Interest , be , and the same I s , hereby distributed to 
Elizabeth W . K i m b a l l , now residing at 2283 Garf ie ld Avenue, Sa l t Lake C i t y , 
Utah 84108. 
The following Is a part icular description of said residue of said Estate 
referred to In this Decree and of which distribution is ordered , adjudged and 
decreed, as aforesaid, to-wi t : 
toox 26i*«358 
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REAL PROPERTY: 
All of Lot 41, Bonneville Garden Second Addition, according to the 
official plat thereof in Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
PERSONAL PROPERTY: 
1966 Chevrolet 4 door automobile bearing Serial No. 27063 
Savings Account 701 1011819 in the amount of $7,399.07 with 
Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Association, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Savings Certificate No. 1787 with Prudential Federal Savings and Loan 
Salt Lake City, Utah 701-0178712 $7,878.19 
200 shares of Silver King Mining Company 
70 shares of American Mutual Building and Loan Company 
267 shares of American Savings & Loan Association 
5100 shares of Tenabo Consolidated Mines Company 
100 shares of Trappers Price Mining Company 
1330 shares Tintic Coalition Mines Company 
1000 shares of Howell Mining Company 
500 shares of Combined Metals, Incorporated 
200 shares Intermountaln Petroleum Company 
4000 shares Flagastaff Bonanza Mining Co. 
500 shares Three Kings Consolidated Mining Co| 
3000 shares Spring Valley Mining Company 
1000 shares Tuma Corporation of Nevada. 
Dated this U day o^fiJ^j< lary, A. D., 1976. 
ATTEST / ' / 
W. 6TETXIN0 EVAK8
 n \ „ / / 
I ^ C ^ ^ - ^ j ^ / * JUDGE 
STATE OF UTAH _*£?? C I 11 £ > $ • 
• « • COUNTY OF SALT LAKT-) ^ \ \ V . * ' /f ', 
> * * i ' * } > I. THc UNOERSIGNEC.VU?!5^ OF THE pWTmC^, 
„ *' •* - COURT OF SALT LAKE,?, V \ \ 7 Y * U T V R D 0 ' H F P £ B Y \ 
.. v\ v f CERTIFY THAT TH€ MSFXtV-NJ FfheOrtlNQ £ \ 
- 0 ' ' / . ' A TRU£ A N 0 fULCqc?* o^vc. hnw^KXL OOQU;» < 
V
 jr • y „» MENTONFlLEINMY^»CLin.sC^^C».E^ V * j 
• *' V . W,TN5$? MY ^**{Jfy 5*AL>OI.SA»D CQURtf « 
' ; , ' ' . ' T^ 'S ?*& DAY OF 'ffajLi^f J fl fSH
 f 
BY Crf&Tirr/t (jtf///tyr/fryo&W 
eooK 2 6 1 ^ 3 5 9 
<?Z& ^4-AS A^^ 
fa£-gt>£-d7f7 
EXHIBIT "A" 
To Whom It May Concerni 
I, Marion G. Fletcher, of Salt Lake City, Utah, do 
hereby declare that I am the son of Roy Fletcher/ formerly a 
resident of Park City, Utah* This document relates to property 
of Roy Fletcher known as the Park Avenue property. 
During the lifetime of my father, I had discussions 
with him regarding this Park Avenue property and the use by him 
of the adjacent Kimball property. The legal description and a 
pictorial survey of the Kimball property is displayed on the 
page attached hereto. My father acknowledged the ownership of 
the Kimball property by Gilbert John Kimball and Maude S. Kim-
ball, his wife, having stated that his use of the roadways and 
buildings and his use of the Kimball property was by permission 
of Gilbert J. Kimball under a revokable agreement my father had 
worked out with him. The above recitation has also always been 
my understanding of the matter. 
It was my father's understanding that at any time 
Gilbert J. Kimball would request, the improvements placed on 
the Kimball property would be subject to removal by my father 
without compensation, and use of the Kimball property discontinued. 
Dated this jj (& day of &^&f .' 1980« JjkvU/ 
iK10H G. FLETCHER 
Signed and de l ivered 
in the presence of: 
*". Is/u 3/Jzr/^ / ^Ac^tfAoH-f-^f 
TREASURER'S OFFICE 
SUMMIT COUNTY, UTAH 
TaxPayer w \ No. 6 0 0 4 
' \ \ i \0VK °) be 
r\ V Coalville, Utah , .AX. \X- / . l . .U- - .^» . . t 19./1. 
f Received of . j ^ X A A J . . \ ^ . \ » / ^ . . . . r ^ . . ^ 
•-*-—••••. .....v—*....w. .A. . .k.A^.t .A«. .u^uAu.. .w.A..rtMa. . . . . i .Vty. .>. . .L.^.ux. .Y>'>i .A. . . .M . . .>tM .u. . . . i | . t . . . . i i . . . . u . . . M y u i i a 
the tame being paid to redeem from tax tale the following described premises Situated in Summit County, State of Utah, to wi 
(v\ 
,\'.>'\\jk1A"i 
r\ . MA V \ 
a certain tale thereof for delinquent taxes having been made by the Treasurer of Summit County on 
\ \ ; \ v
 Y':' u 
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